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Neuroscience has become prevalent in recent years; nevertheless, its value in the
examination of psychological and philosophical phenomena is still a matter of debate.
The examples reviewed here suggest that neuroscientific tools can be significant in the
investigation of such complex phenomena. In this article, we argue that it is important
to study concepts that do not have a clear characterization and emphasize the role
of neuroscience in this quest for knowledge. The data reviewed here suggest that
neuroscience may (1) enrich our knowledge; (2) outline the nature of an explanation; and
(3) lead to substantial empirical and theoretical discoveries. To that end, we review work
on hedonia and eudaimonia in the fields of neuroscience, psychology, and philosophy.
These studies demonstrate the importance of neuroscientific tools in the investigation of
phenomena that are difficult to define using other methods.
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“Begin discussion—by saying what is happiness.” Charles Darwin.
A note in one of Darwin’s early workbooks, written 2 years
following his return from the voyage on board the H. M. S. Beagle
and in the midst of writing an account of this voyage (McMahon,
2006, p. 410).
INTRODUCTION: NEUROSCIENCE AND THE STUDY OF THE
HUMANITIES
As scientists we seek to make sense of the world. Yet as Socrates
lamented, the more we learn, the more we learn how little we
know. This paradoxical condition makes one wonder how we can
make sense of that which we can barely even characterize. Such
is the case in the study of consciousness and free will (Gazzaniga,
2006), of God, faith and morality (Dawkins, 2006; Haidt, 2008;
Kauffman, 2010), and of emotions (Ben-Ze’ev, 2000; Griffiths,
2001). As brain imaging evolved, the belief that these new sci-
entific tools can help us solve old humanistic problems evolved
alongside it. The strongest supporters of these tools argue that all
we need to do to solve philosophy’s greatest unanswered ques-
tions is to reconstruct them as questions of neuroscience. The
fiercest objectors, conversely, exclaim that neuroscience is nothing
more than a set of meaningless correlations, “neuro-nonsense”
that adds nothing to the explanation of the human condition
(Scruton, 2012). AsMencken (1949) said, “There is always an easy
solution to every human problem—neat, plausible, and wrong.”
In our view, such is the case for both of the aforementioned
views.
In this article we focus on the study of happiness as an example
of a concept whose characterization is debateable. We discuss the
advantages of studying concepts that do not have a clear charac-
terization, and emphasize the role of neuroscience in this inquiry.
We argue that neuroscience may (1) enrich our knowledge about
the underlying physiological correlates of human behavior; (2)
outline and characterize the nature of human experience, refute
contradictory explanations and expand existing theories; and (3)
lead to substantial empirical and theoretical discoveries. Indeed,
neuroscience may reveal findings hitherto inaccessible through
other disciplines and subsequently result in substantial theoretical
developments (Figure 1).
STUDYING EMOTIONS: IS DEFINITION NECESSARY FOR
SCIENTIFIC INVESTIGATION?
By their nature, emotions are complex phenomena, affected by
various cultural, contextual, and personal features. Therefore,
it has been claimed that a single definition cannot capture the
variance and essence of emotions (Ben-Ze’ev, 2000; Griffiths,
2001). Ben-Ze’ev (2000) believes that emotional complexity stems
primarily from the following factors: (1) emotions are highly
sensitive to contextual and personal factors; (2) emotions do
not appear in isolation, but rather within a cluster of emotional
attitudes; and (3) the linguistic use of emotional terms is con-
fusing. Coping with this complexity requires adopting adequate
conceptual tools. Three such tools are the following: (1) proto-
type categories having neither clear-cut boundaries nor a unitary
degree of membership; (2) the use of various levels of descrip-
tions, such as neuroscience, biology, psychology, sociology, and
philosophy, and of various perspectives within each level; and
(3) the use of systematic classifications of different emotional
aspects, such as systematically discerning the basic evaluative and
motivational aspects of emotions (Ben-Ze’ev, 2000).
Specifically, in the following we show how a philosophical
notion, in our case the Aristotelian notion of eudaimonia, is
examined by means of psychology and then by neuroscience.
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FIGURE 1 | A schematic model demonstrating the outflow from abstract philosophical concepts to psychological paradigms and neuroscientific
methods of investigation. Neuroscientific findings can enhance our understanding of both psychological and philosophical inquiries.
These connections are easier to explain than the direct connec-
tion between neuroscience and philosophy, although we do not
reject the possibility of such a direct connection.
WHAT IS HAPPINESS?
Happiness has been the subject of centuries of philosophical
and psychological scrutiny. We examine the central Aristotelian
notion of eudaimonia from a philosophical perspective and then
describe it in psychological terms. After that we examine the
relevance of neuroscience to these discussions (Figure 2).
Aristotle distinguishes between hedonia, which expresses the
feeling aspect of happiness, and eudaimonia, which expresses the
more general notion of human prosperity and sense of well-being.
Whereas eudaimonia refers to quality of life as a whole, and espe-
cially to an individual’s virtuous functioning in life, hedonia refers
merely to having good feelings, or getting what you want, or
enjoying something you are doing. Hedonia is typically a feature
of eudaimonia. Nevertheless, although feeling good about life and
functioning in life are related, they are distinct phenomena (Deci
and Ryan, 2008; Keyes and Annas, 2009). Whereas hedonia can
be found among grazing animals, both hedonia, and eudaimonia
are found in humans.
The concept of eudaimonia is relevant to discussions con-
cerning various philosophical issues, among them the meaning-
fulness of life (Baumeister et al., 2013), the nature of mental
health (Keyes, 2002), and the nature of love (Mendham, 2007).
Examining this notion on both the psychological and the neu-
roscientific levels of descriptions may contribute to clarification
of the Aristotelian notion and to its revision in light of empirical
evidence.
The notion of hedonia is simpler and easier to measure, while
the notion of eudaimonia is more complex and harder to quantify.
Whereas hedonia refers to a present subjective state, eudaimonia
connects the present, past and future in an individual’s virtu-
ous activities, which are expressions of the individual’s unique
nature and capacities. These differences are reflected in the greater
number of scientific articles devoted to hedonia (Kringelbach and
Berridge, 2009). For example, a recent PubMed search using the
term “hedonia” yielded 51 papers, while a similar search using the
term “eudaimonia” yielded only 15 papers.
Kashdan et al. (2008) assert that the distinction between
hedonic and eudaimonic well-being is unwarranted
philosophically and scientifically. They argue that the two
types of happiness are not easily segregated and that eudaimonia
is not well-defined and has not been measured consistently. They
further claim that empirical evidence currently suggests that
hedonic and eudaimonic well-being overlap conceptually, and
may represent psychological mechanisms that operate together.
Their criticism is refuted by the psychologists Carol Ryff (2013)
and Alan Waterman (2008), the sociologist Corey Keyes and the
philosopher Julia Annas (Keyes and Annas, 2009). The dispute’s
very presence indicates the usefulness of discussions between
philosophers, psychologists, and sociologists on philosophical
issues. Neuroscientists, we believe, can successfully contribute to
this discussion.
THE USE OF NEUROSCIENTIFIC METHODS IN THE
INVESTIGATION OF HAPPINESS
Hedonia is not merely the sensation we feel as a result of a
pleasing stimulation. Rather, it is the outcome of specific neural
activation (referred to as “hedonic hotspots”) toward such stim-
ulation, without it even the most pleasing sensation would have
no effect (Berridge and Kringelbach, 2011). These regions include
the nucleus accumbens shell, the ventral pallidum, the forebrain,
and the limbic-cortical and deep brainstem regions, including the
parabrachial pontine nucleus (Peciña et al., 2006). Hedonia, as
Aristotle noted, is by no means a unique human experience. In
fact one might be surprised by the cross specie similarity in the
brain regions that govern hedonia’s genesis. In fact a mapping
of the archipelago of hedonic hotspots in rodent’s brain using
drug micro-injections revealed a picture analogs to the one found
in humans (Berridge and Kringelbach, 2011). Furthermore, both
the mid-lateral orbitofrontal cortex and the medial orbitofrontal
edge have been implicated in coding of hedonic experiences
(Berridge and Kringelbach, 2011). These two areas however, have
very distinct roles. Activity in the mid-lateral orbitofrontal cortex
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FIGURE 2 | Happiness as an example of the way in which a neuroscientific approach may shed light on longstanding philosophical debates.
correlates with subjective pleasantness of stimuli such as food,
drugs, and music. This activity acts as a sort of pleasure barom-
eter, tracking changes in subjective pleasure from sensation, as
in the inconceivable case of eating chocolate to the point of sati-
ety (Berridge and Kringelbach, 2011, 2013). On the other hand,
the activity of the medial orbitofrontal edge codes the subjec-
tive valence of positive and negative events, and does not seem
to change as the pleasantness of a sensation diminishes (Berridge
and Kringelbach, 2011), thus its response to chocolate will always
outshine the one for broccoli. This immunization to change may
serve as the gateway between neural regions involved in hedonia
and those related to the vaguer concept of eudaimonia. These
neuroimaging studies enhance our understanding of the man-
ner in which an experience gloss coating is done by a network
of hedonic hotspots. Moreover, they serve as critical milestones
in refining how hedonia is characterized as they support the view
that hedonia and eudaimonia do not overlap, at least not neuro-
logically. Lastly, as proposed by Berridge and Kringelbach (2011),
they bring us a step closer to understanding that hedonic balance
might be the key for a generation of eudaimonia and well-being.
As mentioned, not many studies have examined eudaimonia.
What turned the tides was Ryff ’s model of well-being (1989,
2013), which bridged between philosophical discussions and
neuroscientific studies. Ryff ’s model drew on the roots of the
Aristotelian concept, underlining the central role of having a
purpose to life, autonomy, personal growth, environmental mas-
tery, positive relationships, and self-acceptance (Archontaki et al.,
2013). Ryff cemented her model by supporting it with the work
of some of the most prominent thinkers and psychologists of the
20th century, among them Jung, Maslow, Rogers, and Erikson.
Without the development of Ryff ’s quantitative tools, the solem-
nity of the philosophical accounts would have very little rele-
vance to our daily life, and therefore would not have counted
for much.
Recently, Keyes et al. (2010) sought to tap into the genetic
basis for eudaimonia. In a twin-based study they inspected the
structure of both genetic and environmental influences on eudai-
monia and found a strong hereditable genetic factor influencing
eudaimonia. The factors that comprise eudaimonia are the sub-
ject of an interesting debate. While Ryff suggested a six-factor
model of eudaimonia comprising autonomy, personal growth,
self-acceptance, purpose in life, positive relations with others,
and environmental mastery, others have claimed that the over-
lap between these factors is so high that they constitute a single
factor (Springer et al., 2006). To test these opposing theoreti-
cal views, Archontaki et al. (2013) employed a classic twin study
approach. The six-factor well-being questionnaire (Ryff, 1989)
was completed by 837 identical or fraternal twins. Structural
equation modeling examined the impact of genetic and environ-
mental factors on each well-being factor. The results support the
view that eudaimonia is impacted by a complex genetic structure.
Five distinct genetic factors were found to influence psychological
well-being, manifesting biological commonalities between differ-
ent sub-scales as well as unique aspects. Environmental effects
were not supported by the data. Lewis et al. (2014) further found
a positive association between the size of the right insular cor-
tex, a region previously negatively associated with depression, and
scores on Ryff ’s well-being scale. These results were found for
the general score and for three independent subscales: purpose
in life, positive relations, and personal growth. This association,
however, is not an indication of casualty. Hence, we cannot know
whether greater gray matter volume is a prerequisite for higher
eudaimonia or a result of it.
Coltheart (2006, 2013; Tressoldi et al., 2012) noted that
most neuroimaging studies focus on the localization of regions
involved in certain cognitive and psychological functions.
Notably, this suggestion is based on the (yet, disputed) belief that
psychological processes can be localized in principle. Coltheart
(2006) emphasized the need to use neuroimaging in order to
distinguish between competing psychological theories. Perhaps
the use of neuroimaging to inquire philosophically-complex con-
cepts can further enhance our theoretic understanding of such
concepts: although the experiments of Berridge and Kringelbach
aim at localization, they are in line with the aim of distinguish-
ing between competing theories, in the sense that the findings
enhance our understanding of hedonia as opposed to eudaimo-
nia. Had the researchers obtained similar activations for both
processes, the conclusions might have been different. Similarly,
the genetic studies mentioned above are in line with this aim,
although it should be noted that while Coltheart focused on
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org June 2014 | Volume 8 | Article 388 | 3
Naor et al. Neuroscience and the humanities
neuroimaging, here we have adapted his framework to other sci-
entific tools. In line with our initial argument about the necessity
for characterization as a basis for scientific inquiry, these studies
demonstrate the feasibility, as well as the importance, of exam-
ining complex and yet-to-be-defined concepts. Furthermore,
these examples demonstrate the dynamic reciprocal interaction
between philosophical and psychological views andmodels on the
one hand and biological-based investigations on the other. Given
a theoretical model as an anchor, biological tools can be used to
further our knowledge and fine-tune our psychological views.
A NEUROSCIENTIFIC VIEW ON TRADITIONAL
PHILOSOPHICAL QUESTIONS
As noted, recent studies have used neuroscientific methods and
tools, including neuroimaging, genetics, event-related potentials,
behavioral reaction time, and accuracy measures, to explore the
underlying mechanisms of happiness. In recent years the use of
neuroimaging has become common in many fields. For exam-
ple, the use of neuroscientific approaches has been debated in
the context of consciousness (Block, 2007; Koch and Tsuchiya,
2007). Similar to emotions, consciousness has been the subject
of research in philosophy for centuries. Ever since Descartes pro-
posed that “Cogito ergo sum”—I think, therefore I am—the
worlds of philosophy and science have spiraled into an ongoing
debate about the dualism of body andmind (e.g., Damasio, 1994).
Recent neuroimaging studies of patients in a vegetative state have
revealed neural activation in regions known to be involved in
face processing when these patients were presented with pictures
depicting emotional facial expressions (Sharon et al., 2013). These
findings have provided important insights about information
processing at different levels of consciousness, which could not
have been provided by other methods. Furthermore, neuroimag-
ing and electrophysiology studies comparing stimuli presented
in conscious and non-conscious manners have provided insights
about the neural underpinnings of conscious and non-conscious
information processing (see Haynes, 2009 and Rees, 2013, for
reviews). What is relevant here is that consciousness is not a clear
and defined phenomenon. On the contrary, as Gazzaniga (2012)
stated in a recent interview, there is still a long road to travel
before science is able to define what consciousness is or under-
stand how it works. Nevertheless, it is important to investigate
different aspects of consciousness using neuroscientific, philo-
sophical, and biological methods in order to shed light on the
experiences of awareness and of the self.
More generally, other concepts that are merely characterized
but not defined, such as emotion, should nevertheless be the sub-
ject of scientific inquiry. For example, Theodoridis and Nelson
(2012) discuss the promises and pitfalls of neuroimaging in the
context of political psychology, and conclude that neuroimaging
should be considered a valid tool for studying political psychol-
ogy (see also Hruby, 2012, for a recommendation to employ
neuroscience in education studies).
These examples demonstrate how neuroscientific methods
illuminate important aspects of complex phenomena. We argue
that neuroscientific investigation can provide new insights that
may lead to theoretical changes by revealing findings that were
not hypothesized a priori. For example, Siman-Tov et al. (2007)
set out to compare the processing of emotional and neutral face
stimuli. To that end, they presented face pictures in the right and
the left visual fields. Serendipitously, following left visual field
stimulation they found enhanced activations in attention-related
brain regions. They further conducted a causal analysis to explain
the left field bias, leading them to propose a model that dif-
fers from the classic model of attention bias (see also follow-up
investigation in Okon-Singer et al., 2011).
It is interesting to note that neuroscience, and particularly neu-
roimaging, has led to great expectations, as well as to the opposite
view that such methods cannot contribute to the study of psycho-
logical phenomena (e.g., Coltheart, 2006; Page, 2006; Poldrack,
2006; Papanicolaou, 2007; Aue et al., 2009). Tressoldi et al. (2012)
argue that most neuroimaging studies have focused on localizing
cognitive processes, and thus have not resulted in new insights
regarding psychological theories. Other researchers have pointed
to different improper uses of fMRI. Vul et al. (2009) claimed that
very high correlations found in fMRI studies are due to non-
independent analyses. Aue et al. (2009) noted that studies which
infer that regional brain activation reflects a specific psychologi-
cal process without considering other factors that could have led
to similar activation have resulted in general skepticism regarding
the advantage of using fMRI. Yet despite criticism, the common
and important conclusion is that neuroimaging, when properly
used, is a valid tool to investigate psychological phenomena.
CONCLUSION
Developments in the field of neuroscience have brought with
them the concomitant evolution of two new branches of philoso-
phy. One is neuro-philosophy, or the use of neuroscientific tools
for examining philosophical questions. The other is related to the
philosophy of neuroscience, or the use of philosophical inquiries
in neuroscientific practices (Bickle et al., 2012). In this inquiry of
happiness we used both of these with the hope of formulating the
fullest account of this thorny subject.
Today’s neuroscientist can say virtually nothing about the
psychological content of an emotion merely by looking at the col-
oring of this or that region of the brain. Instead, the neuroscientist
needs the conceptual analysis of the philosopher and the behav-
ioral explanation of the psychologist, which in turn can be used
and manipulated in the lab. In the same manner philosophers
must take into account the work of psychologists and neurosci-
entists and refine their understanding accordingly. These three
can no longer exist and operate in separate realms. Rather, only
through a joint effort can we truly formulate a complete and
accurate understanding of human behavior.
As for happiness, by no means is the quest for its characteri-
zation a purely philosophical endeavor. Enlightenment thinkers
were the first to promise human beings happiness in the here
and now. By the time the dust settled on both great revolutions
of that era, the French and the American, it was widely accepted
that “happiness of all” is a “self-evident truth” (Declaration of the
Rights of Man and of the Citizen; Declaration of Independence,
respectively). The only problem was that while we were all enti-
tled to pursue happiness, we barely knew what we were pursuing,
sending humanity off on a wild goose chase. It should be of
little surprise, then, that after decades of pursuing unattainable
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happiness, depression has become the second leading cause of
disability worldwide (Ferrari et al., 2013).
Be that as it may, the future is not so bleak. We are in the
midst of the neuroscience revolution, in which ever improving
technologies and methods are transforming the human ability
to understand the brain and to intervene with its function-
ing (Wolpe, 2002). It would seem, however, that neuroscience
has an unexpected way of alleviating pain and bettering lives,
not only through the exploration of new drugs and therapeutic
methodologies. Rather, when right questions are asked, tools used
properly, and data interpreted accurately, neuroscience can help
characterize what has otherwise been undefinable, as in the case
of happiness.
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